As a neo-Kantian, he stressed that law discloses a domain of prescriptions that command in an unconditioned, absolute way. Nevertheless and contrary to all formalisms, he also stressed that there was still a substantial basis for this science of what ought to be. This basis was the material realm of values. For him, the knowledge of values must secure the normative content of the juridical norm, i.e., axiology secures law and gives to it an absolute foundation.
Approaching the knowledge of values as foundational to the institution of norms, Moncada turned to the Husserlian method of Wesensschau. This was, in fact, one of the greatest impacts the Ideen had on his general theory of law: to turn axiology into a descriptive, apriori science of the experience of values. Another major impact was the phenomenological analysis of the content of those acts that are directed to the non-substantial, non-natural, non-empirical realm of law as such. Classical phenomenology was chiefly concerned with acts that were beingintentions, i.e., with the analysis of doxic acts. Through the analysis of the intentional acts in which law is intended, Moncada aimed to turn phenomenology to the analysis of "nomic" acts, so to speak, i.e., to the analysis of the operations in which consciousness constitutes not "what is," but the "ought to do" injunction, along with values and norms.
In the realization of this program, Moncada employs-not always in a accurate way-several of the most important concepts and methods of the Ideen: noetic and noematic analysis, intentionality, immanence, transcendence, constitution, formal , and material essences, and so on. He stresses the possibilities opened up by the method of eidetic variation, but he never makes use of the method of transcendental reduction. Rather, in his last essays he emphasizes that eidetic phenomenology, being concerned only with possibilities and ignoring the realm of facts, cannot address the scientific study of positive law. In the end, Husserlian phenomenology, which he introduced systematically in the philosophy of law since the 1930s, was only, for him, a preparatory step towards a fully fledged science of law as an historical formation in human culture. Meanwhile, in Brazil, Miguel Reale (1910 -2006 , another philosopher of law and also Full Professor at the University of Sao Paulo, incorporated phenomenology in his celebrated "three-dimensional theory of law." The "three-dimensional" theory states that law is always a conflation of fact, value, and norm. Addressing what he sees as a "dialectical relationship" between these three dimensions, he stresses that law as norm comes from a previous evaluation of facts of the social and cultural world. Trying to understand this process of a "pre-categorical" experience of law, which is, for him, the very origin of the normative objectification of law (by means of the state) that gives a positive content to the science of law, he emphasizes both its pre-theoretical and historical character. In this context, Reale sees in the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt the "great discovery" of phenomenology, and talks about a "juridical Lebenswelt," meaning the concrete experiences that give rise to the later establishment of positive law by means of the activity of the legislator. As he puts it in "Estruturas e Modelos do Direito", "It seems to me that the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt is very useful both in the study of the genesis of juridical rules, and in the study of its semantic modifications. ... The analysis of the pre-categorical juridical experience is essential to the full comprehension of law, in order to settle its relationship to juridical institutions that represent, in the normative realm, forms under which social conduct and actions are objectified."' Focused on the late Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt, Reale dedicates a full chapter to the phenomenology of the Ideen in his book Filosofia do Direito. He recognizes the richness of eidetic and transcendental reductions and stresses its wide applications to several domains outside philosophy. Nevertheless, he intends to block what he sees as an idealistic turn in Ideen. He states, using the intentionality as a guiding thread, Husserl sought to return from the transcendent object to its noematic content, and, in a final and controversial step, to a self-reflection in which consciousness exposes itself as absolute subjectivity. Contrary to this last endeavor, Reale argues, first, that the subject-object polarization is an ultimate one, and, second, that phenomenology must catch its objects in the cultural world of Lebenswelt and return back to the original institutions of meaning that constitute them. He displays here a Hegelian model of the anamnesis of the experiences of consciousness, combining it with a genetic approach to the original institutions and deposits of meaning. As he writes: "The subjective reflection must show the essential correlation between subject and object, and, therefore, the inconceivability of a transcendental ego without reference to objects and to the world in which they are situated. ... This is the reason why I say that phenomenological reflection culminates in a historic-axiological reflection, in which the subject recognizes itself as reflected in his own spiritual objectifications, the authentic meaning of which must be carried out to its original roots, unveiling its founding intentionality"' in a concrete and historical subjectivity.
Another philosopher of law, Aquiles Guimarães (1937-) , Full Professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, pursued these hints and developed, in a somewhat reactive fashion, a vindication of Husserl's idealistic transcendental philosophy. As he puts it, transcendental and eidetic reductions, first fully presented by Husserl in the Ideen, are the only theoretical stance that can free the science of law from positivism, with its narrow understanding of the phenomenon of law as the bare realm of the posited rules of a factual legislative system. Returning from the factuality of norms to the "law phenomenon" and to the eidetic intuition of law as such, phenomenological description can show the strata of sense involved in the juridical world. Guimarães stresses that the nucleus of law consists in an "emotional apriori," different from the rational apriori of mathematics and logic. As a result, he asserts that there is a "pure intuition of values," and that values are objective formations that sustain an "axiological objectivism." Law is, for him, disclosed as a "regional ontology" of the inter-subjective and cultural world regulated by the supreme value of "juridicity."
Regarding philosophy of law, Guimarães continues as a leading personality in Brazil. His full acceptance of Husserlian phenomenology gave rise to a school of juridical and phenomenological studies at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. 
Philosophers Came Second: The Rise of the Phenomenological School of Coimbra
In the area of philosophy, the first dialogue with the Ideen began a few years later, with a work published in 1947 by Miranda Barbosa objects, but is not able to demonstrate that the objects to which the concepts refer actually exist. Logic, therefore, does not solve, but rather raises a gnoseological problem. In his own words: "The pure analysis of the formal object ... can never prove the actual existence of entities. What could assure existence would be only the "intentional reference" of the concept to the object, but, precisely because that reference is "intentional," it cannot provide real transcendence to the objective sphere."'
The second idea is that the transcendental attitude is both provisional and insufficient. In fact, for Barbosa, the transcendental attitude does not consist in the elaboration of a new concept of reality which could overcome the dispute between realism and idealism, as Husserl supposed, but consists only in a methodical operation used to analyze the connection between the thought and the thought-of objectivity, an analysis in which the ontological status of the objects is left undetermined.
The transcendental attitude is, therefore, for Barbosa, not an answer to but rather a suspension of the Essential Problem of Knowledge. As he elaborates in a passage of his book: "The position of the object in relation to thought can be determined as immanent, transcendent or transcendental. ... To raise the problem of the essence of knowledge seems to be no more than to formulate this question: which of those positions does the object occupy in relation to thought? As we can see, the transcendental option is immediately eliminated .... In fact, the transcendental position of the object is already a logical minimum given by the cognitive phenomenon and it is that situation which raises the question of the immanence or transcendence of the object. ... To say that the object is transcendental is no more than to suspend judgment about its transcendence, and it is precisely this logical indeterminacy that one wants to abolish when moving to the field of theory of knowledge, eventually reaching a conclusion about whether the object is immanent or transcendent or, in other words, whether the object exists or does not exist 'in itself ". 10
The third idea is that there are grounds regarding knowledge to distinguish between descriptive and substantive questions. In fact, the phenomenon of knowledge seems to be the seizing of an external reality. But is it really so or will we have to classify it as an illusion by showing that the object that is given in knowledge is, in fact, immanent to the act of knowing and exists only as a correlate of that act? Such are the problems which, for Barbosa, should be raised against merely descriptive questions. And it is exactly in the conflation of these two problems, or rather in the belief that descriptive questions exhaust substantive questions, that Barbosa sees the main mistake of phenomenology: "It is in this point that Husserl and his students greatly erred, in supposing that to describe is to solve and to consider that the description of the phenomenon [of knowledge] is already the solution to its essential problem."
His critical stand regarding phenomenology is therefore very clear. It can be summarized in the three following tenets:
1"Denial of Fundamentality. The fundamental field of philosophy is a formal semantics (a "logic," as he says) that describes the atomic structure of concepts and the 9 Idem, p. 339.
' Idem, p.331. relation between the meaning content and the objectivity referred to via that content, without taking a stand about the essential problem of knowledge, and without referring to the life of a conscious subjectivity. In the author's own words, the fundamental philosophical discipline is logic and not phenomenology. 2" Report of a mistake. The phenomenological description of knowledge closes itself within the transcendental field and within the relationship between intentional act and intended object. Therefore, for that very same reason, phenomenology cannot be an answer to the essential gnoseological problem.
Attribution of an incapacity. Given its methodological orientation, phenomenology does not allow for the formulation of the fundamental problem about the real existence of the object of knowledge; for this reason, phenomenology, at the very moment it believes it has described the essential laws of knowledge, is really only describing what knowledge seems to be and not what it actually is, a question for which phenomenology has no answer at all.
Eighteen years after the publication of Barbosa's essay, Abranches de Soveral (1927 -2003 wrote the following regarding the Essential Problem of Knowledge: "These considerations aim at a determination of the philosophical value of the phenomenological method in light of this problematic [i.e. the essential problem of knowledge]." ' 2 It couldn't be any clearer that his dialogue with phenomenology is entirely determined by the questions previously raised by Barbosa. Those are precisely the questions which give meaning-and, we should say, a non-phenomenological meaning-to Soveral's attempt to reformulate the Essential Problem of Knowledge within phenomenology. This reformulation is apparently accomplished through the use of some core phenomenological concepts. It appears as follows: "The essential problem of knowledge ... consists in knowing whether the intentional object to which all knowledge refers to is immanent or not to the subject who thinks it."" In comparing this formulation with Barbosa's, one could think that everything is now characterized using phenomenological concepts, namely, through "being immanent" and "transcendent reality," although Barbosa had already used them, while in a strictly ontological sense. However, it is not entirely exact to say that there is here a phenomenological reformulation of the problem, because, as Barbosa had correctly pointed out, the Essential Problem of Knowledge cannot be enunciated within phenomenology. In fact, from the perspective of phenomenology, it is a pseudo-problem, while, from the theoretical perspective of Barbosa, it is the true major problem of all investigation about knowledge. The result was a tension between phenomenology and theory of knowledge, as Barbosa often noted.
Soveral is well aware of this tense relationship between phenomenology and the Essential Problem of Knowledge. He tries to settle it by distinguishing three different "phases" in Husserlian phenomenology: the first where "the essential problem of knowledge is initially not considered," the second where "it is considered that the essential problem has been overcome and no longer makes sense in the transcendental sphere," and finally, the third, in which "the transcendental reduction is not practiced," but in which, on the other hand, "the demands of the essential problem of knowledge are taken into consideration." 4 The first phase refers to eidetic phenomenology. The second is, for Soveral, the version of phenomenology started in 1907 and developed in Ideen. Regarding the third phase, which would be the version of phenomenology most appropriate for a dialogue with Barbosa's gnoseological questions, Soveral, revealingly, recognizes that while it is a version pertaining to the "early stages" of phenomenology-but not to be confused with eidetic phenomenology-it finds its expression chiefly in the work of Nicolai Hartmann. Therefore, it is as if the Essential Problem of Knowledge did not have another intersection with phenomenology then the work of an author such as Hartmann, who used phenomenology in the wider context of a "metaphysics of knowledge," which is quite different from transcendental phenomenology sensu stricto.
The attempt to bring the Essential Problem of Knowledge to phenomenology demands the task of developing a completely innovative formulation of that problem, first relatively to Barbosa's own formulation, and second to phenomenology itself.
A brief analysis of Soveral's reformulation can show where his endeavors brought him. In relation to Barbosa, the focus is no longer placed on thought and the relation of thought to its object, as Barbosa had done by using the concept of "thought" not in a psychological sense but in a logical-semantic one. On the contrary, the focus is now placed on the subject and his act, in a broad psychological and real sense.
Soveral does not ask, as Barbosa does, if knowledge is what it seems to be, but rather if the object is immanent to the subject who thinks it. This modification is not unimportant because it gives a subjective-psychological accent to a problematic which, for Barbosa, was strictly "logical" and gnoseological. This difference is assumed by Soveral in a long note in which he explains himself in respect to his teacher. He concludes: "we relate the immanence and transcendence of the object to the subject of knowledge; Barbosa refers both to the thought itself." Concerning phenomenology, even if dressed with the phenomenological concepts of intentionality, immanence, and transcendence, the Essential Problem of Knowledge can only be formulated when one imposes on phenomenology a questionnaire which is alien or at least peripheral to it. For the transcendental phenomenology of the Ideen, there is no place for the question whether, somewhere behind the reality scrutinized by the meaning-intentions of a constituting transcendental life, there is still a reality in itself which would be similar to it. Reality is the object of the consciousness of reality. And the consciousness of reality is described by the phenomenology of reason. A concept such as "absolute reality," independent of any relation to a constituting intentionality, makes no good sense for the phenomenology of the Ideen. The problem here posed to phenomenology is, therefore, an extra-phenomenological one. And it is precisely in this departure from the transcendental and idealist problematic of Ideen that Soveral's thought would later develop at Oporto University, were he was Full Professor.
Alexandre Morujão (1922 Morujão ( -2009 ) was for about four decades professor at the Faculty of Letters at Coimbra. His undergraduate thesis, A Doutrina da Intencionalidade na Fenomenologia de Husserl,15 is characterized by an approach to phenomenology in terms which are not exactly the ones we find in later works by the same author, but which can be placed alongside the-almost contemporaryapproaches by Júlio Fragata or Gustavo de Fraga. His thesis is concerned with testing the limits of phenomenology; that is, more than showing where phenomenology has not gone, he is mostly interested in showing where it can never go, given its starting point.
Therefore, in A Doutrina da Intencionalidade, phenomenology-as it appears in Ideen-is presented as being simultaneously a reflection oriented towards objects, "in order to discover them as a component of lived experiences," and as a questioning about the nature of subjectivity, which would "represent what in traditional philosophical conceptions corresponds to the Absolute." Morujão, in his interpretation of Husserl's 1913 work, finds at least three problematic points in the attempt to raise subjectivity to the Absolute: (i) an ambiguity in the explanation of the relation between the empirical-psychological Ego and the transcendental Ego; (ii) an insufficiency in the explanation of the meaning of reason that lies beneath the notion of intentionality, making phenomenology, contrary to the grand systems of classical rationalism, a philosophy which explains the finite by the finite, integrating the "imperfection" of objects-since they are only given in adumbrations-in the very process of their constitution; and (iii) a refusal of ontology despite the several ontological implications contained in the doctrine of intentionality, thus reducing phenomenology to an egology or, even worse, "to a Cogito limited to a subjectivity without exteriority," due to the absence of a transcendent being that may give to it real density.
In his later work Mundo e Intencionalidade, 16 Morujão fully addresses the main themes of the Ideen. Among them, the nature and scope of the epochë, objects considered only as intentional formations of consciousness, the reductions, the world as phenomenon, the noetic-noematic correlation, and the relationship between noema and object. It is also in this book that the question concerning the relationship between Husserl and Descartes is raised. Morujdo emphasizes the instrumental aspect of the Cartesian doubt in order to explain the epochë, but he also shows that the Cartesian path is not the best in order to grant access to the phenomenological attitude. Here the author points to well-known passages in Husserl's Erste Philosophie II. As he puts it, If the epochë is the ground upon which one can establish philosophy as a rigorous science, if, as uninterested spectator, I can disconnect "from the existence and consistency of the perceived object and from the existence of the world in general," this is because there is a disinterested Ego who observes the Ego which is engaged in the world, transforming it in a theme for reflection and preserving all the content of it. Therefore, if some texts from the Ideen present a notion of consciousness similar to the Cartesian one, based on an abrupt split between the pure and the natural (psychological) Ego, this is because they belong to an initial stage of Husserl's formulation of the method of epochë, where the method of Cartesian doubt was adopted as a guideline.
Numerous texts of Husserl's last phase correct the account of reduction in his Ideen. According to Morujdo, phenomenology there established itself immediately in the transcendental ego thanks to the epochë, through a reinforcement of the Cartesian doubt, but it is difficult to understand how, from a negative definition of consciousness as "phenomenological residue," one can obtain a new kind of fundamental science. This position starts being corrected in the Cartesianische Meditationen, where the point of departure is a concrete consciousness. The starting point becomes the cogitatum rather than the cogito; the former introduces the latter and not the contrary. But it is in Erfahrung und Urteil and in §53 of Die Krisis that the cogitatum can be interpreted not only as a pre-given world, with all its significative structures and intra-mundane sciences, but also as a life-world. Particularly in Erfahrung und Urteil, Husserl explains that the epochë is performed, in fact, in two separate moments: first as the return from the pre-given world, with all its meaning sedimentations and scientific determinations, to the primordial life-world; and secondly, as a regressive questioning into the subjective operations of consciousness. In this way are clarified the ontological implications of phenomenology, which already concerned Moruj'ão in his first book. In fact, once the epochë is performed, phenomenology cannot present itself as a pure method. Phenomenology needs to know something about the ontological structure of what was made an object of reduction, so that it may ensure the validity of the descriptive procedures it is putting in use. However, the intuitionism of phenomenology is characterized by a permanent wavering between a "seeing that gives the object" and a "seeing which constitutes it." What guides the understanding of the subjective functions is the object perceived and it can only appear in the horizon of the world; that means, however, that the constitutive origin of the world, as Husserl understands it, will always escape the phenomenological regard. This conclusion of phenomenology will hence, according to Morujão, demand a speculative reappraisal. Gustavo de Fraga (1922 -2003 was a professor at the University of Coimbra, where he also completed his PhD with a dissertation titled De Husserl a Heidegger." The main theme of his investigations concerning Husserl is the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics, and this theme determines the angle of his approach to the problematic of the Ideen. Although the author recognizes some justification in the attempt to eliminate any relation between metaphysical idealism and phenomenology, by making the latter a mere method, he also observes that this would mean a change in its effective course. The truth is that phenomenology's metaphysical implications are immediately present in the relation, albeit tense, between the doctrine of intentionality and the teleology of consciousness, that is, in the postulation of an Absolute prior to all evidence. In Husserl, therefore, the theory of reduction does not culminate in a divinization of subjectivity, although at times it does seem his idealism would lead to it, but rather to an opening of the Ego, via reflection, to an unbounded interiority of an Augustinian brand-which is quite clear in the relations between subjectivity and time-, the metaphysical consequences of which Husserl intended to investigate in later manuscripts. Supported by texts from the Manuscripts E III 9 and E III 10, Fraga finds in Husserl the recognition of a universal absolute will living in subjects, which opens them to an irrational only accessible through faith. Subjectivity is, therefore, the path to the Absolute. Suspending not only the thesis of the world, but also of the unity of an empiricalpsychological Ego interested in the world, the reduction departs from the factual Ego and reaches a free, boundless Ego.
According to Fraga, the static analysis of the Ideen is surpassed by the discovery of immanent temporality. Some interpreters of Husserl, such as Landgrebe, led, since very early, the interpretation of Husserl's philosophy to a point which is common today. The evolution in Husserl's thought can be retraced, globally, in three phases: (1) a first phase marked by the return to acts in which ideal unities of meaning are constituted; (2) a second one characterized by the constitution of those acts as immanent temporal unities; and (3) a third, finally, characterized by the self-constitution of the temporal flow of consciousness. In this way, the path leads from an "I" conceived as the "phenomenological residue of Weltvernichtung" and as transcendence in immanence, to an "I" as a temporal flux of lived experiences and, beyond this last one-and also beyond the problematic of Ideen-to an non-temporal Ur-kh, "an originary present that is not a modality of time," from which the flux of time arises, as well as the transcendences flowing in it. Supporting his analyses with the Husserlian C-Manuscripts, Fn.& notes that this pure I is the origin of time, but is outside time. Time is founded upon a present which is not in time, because it is from it that time comes out. It is a living-present, similar to the nunc stans (to the "what always is") which, according to Augustine, characterizes God's way of being. It is in this fashion, via time, that, according to Fraga, Husserl follows the path of metaphysics towards the absolute.
Mature Readings
Mho Fragata , an influential teacher at the University of Braga, Portugal, was a Jesuit who studied theology with Karl Rahner S.J. and presented, a few years later (1954) Since his early works, Fragata critically considered the purpose of phenomenology to be the radical realization of the idea of scientificity, as Husserl aimed for when he presented his philosophy as a "science free of presuppositions." The phenomenological reduction of Ideen is presented by Fragata as a methodological device conveying an idealism which is only "unreal and methodic"; this idealism is appropriate to fulfill the goal of a first philosophy as a science of things as they are known, but, at its core, it is still compatible with an ontological realism: "Husserl's idealism may be considered methodic," "The originality of the epochë is precisely that it makes an idealism possible without contradicting realism." 9
In light of this conflation between his own realism and the interpretation of Ideen's idealism as merely methodic, very early in his work Fragata breaks with Husserl's idea that the phenomenological-transcendental questions exhaust the field of philosophical questions. Fragata's reflexive efforts will therefore aim to show that the return to the natural attitude is not only inevitable within philosophy, but also that only in this attitude can one arrive at the absolutely radical philosophical questions.
This break with Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a science free of presuppositions comes to be gradually developed in the course of Fragata's complete philosophical production. It is, however, already announced, in its essential lines, in the work of 1959, namely, in the way in which he attempts to show an insurmountable difficulty in Husserl's doctrine of intentionality.
In fact, the relation between "predicate-noemata" and the determinable X, or "object pure and simple," is the vexata quaestio of the interpretation of paragraphs 129-34 of the Ideen. In Husserl's exposition, the noeses are correlated to an objectual content, or ideal unity of meaning, designated by the term "noema." Intentionality is not, however, referred to noema as an object, but to the object by means of the noema in such a way that the end-point of the intentional relation is described as an "object X," which is intended by means of one or many noemata.
Fragata highlights this peculiar transcendence in the midst of the noema, as if consciousness surpassed itself not only to what is immanent to it in an intentional way (the noema itself), but also to what is purely and simply transcendent: "This reference [to object X] can only be explained with a new type of 'transcendence' within consciousness and so, therefore, as the noema transcends noesis, so should the 'object' transcend the noema." Fragata interprets this object X as a tertium quid between the noema, as intentional immanence, and the transcendent object of the natural attitude, in such a way that it would result from the ambiguous fusion of them. In fact, these texts from the Ideen give Fragata the opportunity for an interpretative decision which he expresses as follows: "As a consequence of this theoretical position [Husserl's own], it is as if the intentional object wavers between the noema and the peculiar transcendence of the natural attitude."'" The object thus maintains, on the one hand, "the immanent and therefore intrinsic character of the noema and, on the other hand, a type of immanent transcendence arises here, which gives it a character, if we may express it in this way, of a type of transcendental 'in itself. '"2 ' This supposed obscurity in Husserl's doctrine leads Fragata to the first formulation of a far-reaching critique to transcendental phenomenology. For him, the ambiguous status of the object X in the Husserlian doctrine of intentionality in the Ideen means that objectivity cannot be entirely reduced to a subjective genesis (relative to the object only as intended). It also means that the natural attitude is not fully absorbed by the transcendental attitude, but rather that, on the contrary, the world of natural experience should be maintained as a sphere to which philosophy (and not only the empirical sciences) should inevitably return, thus abandoning the phenomenological reduction and the identification of being and being-for consciousness. "We do not recognize the possibility of stopping in pure signification, that is, in the object as merely signified, as Husserl proposes. And this means to fall back, inevitably, into the natural attitude."22 Based on these theses, Fragata attempts at last a complete overthrow of Husserl's fundamental position. For Fragata, "the excess of radicalism manifests itself, in fact, as a lack of radicalism," because "if Husserl wanted to develop his phenomenology as the true foundation of philosophy, he would have to deny the reality of the object as exterior and, in general, the world existing in itself." Consequently, "a profound analysis of this problem would lead him to the conclusion that, after all, the true radical attitude consists in starting with the object as known, but not in considering it as merely known." In this way, "the ideal of radical foundation was, as in Descartes, condemned to failure," because the necessary departure from the transcendental attitude towards the sphere of the natural one "is not, by any means, equivalent to falling to a naïve or pre-scientific stance," but is imposed "by virtue of the very same demand for radicalism."2'
In short, for Fragata, if it is correct that the reduction from being to phenomenon is the appropriate strategy for clarifying the how of knowledge, on the other hand, it leaves completely in the dark the question of how the phenomenon in itself is even possible or, to use his expression, what is the ontological foundation of the "phenomenality of the phenomenon." This is the reason why the transcendental attitude leads back to the natural attitude. The demand for the conditions of phenomenality imposes a regressive question about the very possibility of givenness, and this is no less than a return to natural attitude. This is the very path which allows Fragata to return, beyond Husserl, to realism and to metaphysical speculation, both so important for his Thomistic education. Fernando Gil was an original Portuguese philosopher. Until his death, he taught simultaneously at the New University of Lisbon, Portugal, and the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. He was not a phenomenologist by formation. His life-long intellectual interests were concentrated chiefly in problems pertaining to epistemology. Nonetheless, he received continuous inspiration from some authors of the phenomenological tradition, in particular Husserl. As he put it in La Conviction, "the epistemological analysis continues itself through the phenomenology of the act of knowing . "24 Reading Husserl, he addressed many questions, like those concerning time-consciousness, the transcendental ego, passive genesis, and, most importantly of all, the phenomenological theory of evidence. As a matter of fact, as an epistemologist, Gil was concerned by the problems of proof, on the one hand, and by the subjective experience of conviction, on the other. He wrote two books about it: Preuves and La Conviction. 25 Nevertheless, both the objective procedures of proof-making and the subjective growth of conviction, point together to a kind of proto-experience where truth imposes itself without proof, as the compulsive, immediate and direct presence of the thing itself. This proto-experience is called evidence. In his book about it, Traité de l'evidence, Gil considers Husserl as "the unique thinker who has deeply developed a doctrine about evidence."26 Indeed, Husserl presents a genealogy of evidence in works such as Erfahrung und Urteil, and both a description and an epistemic qualification of evidence in works like the Ideen and Cartesianische Meditationen. Since Gil intends to bring about what he calls an "archeology of evidence," Husserl's approach is, then, "the major reference" in his entire book, among so many other authors he discusses at length, such as Duns Scott, Ockham, Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche, or Moritz Schlick.
Gil starts from the assumption that evidence is entrenched in the perceptionlanguage system. Evidence is not the bare intuition of a thing, nor a simple linguistic representation of it. It is rather the settling of a tension going from thing-anticipation through meaning-representation to thing-giveness trough intuition; evidence is, then, the outcome of a complete satisfaction of an expectation. Husserl's fundamental conceptual pair intention/fulfillment is, then, for Gil, a strong insight into the deepest structures of evidence. Husserl refused any affective character of evidence, as Gil remembers, quoting a text from Ideen about a supposed "feeling of evidence." Nonetheless, for Gil, Husserl's correct refusal of a kind of "mystical" feeling as a mark of evidence is one-sided, after all, because, to begin with, the pair intention/fulfillment is a kind of "theoretical refinement" of a deeper psychic structure based on the pair desire/satisfaction, and, despite his refusal, Husserl himself talks about a "contentment in knowledge," or a "satisfaction in fulfillment," or an "endeavor to the possession of the thing itself," recognizing rightly that "there is a contentment proper to evidence."" The other conceptual pair that Gil acknowledges as fundamental for a theory of evidence is Husserl's related concepts of "adequacy" and "apodicticity," which Gil puts on the side of the sign in the pairs language/perception, intention/fulfillment (and eventually desire/satisfaction): "adequacy emphasizes the fulfilling presence of the being intentioned, while apodicticity is like another name for the evident knowledge. Apodicticity-peak of the Richtigkeit-points to the epistemological side of evidence, whereas adequacy points to its ontological root." 28
Gil's theory of evidence is developed in two stages. First, he proceeds to the deduction of the concepts of evidence. Second, he identifies the operator of evidence. Regarding the first stage, he presents the concepts of attention (with its roots in orientation), ostention (rooting in contact), intuition (founded in vision), and injunction (arising from voice), as the cornerstones of evidence. The discussion with Husserl's conceptions is very significant concerning the phenomenological analysis of orientation, attention, contact, and most of all intuition (mainly in the Ideen and Erfahrung und Urteil). Concerning the second stage, the after all not so surprising thesis of Gil is that hallucination is the operator of evidence. The close relation between evidence and hallucination is to a certain extent concealed due to the dominance of the pathological approach to hallucination. Yet the concealment is not so complete, given that "evidence is wholly fashioned by a hallucinatory language, ... and the homology-unexpected and non-trivial-between the description of evidence and the description of hallucination."" Gil identifies a threefold operation. 3° First, what he calls the X-operation (Freud's "primitive hallucination" of the baby hallucinating his mother's breast), connecting desire and an aesthesical feeling of satisfaction; second, a H-operation, intellectualizing the aesthesical feeling in the experience of a compulsive presence, which metaphorically express itself as "awaking," "capture," "light," and "voice," and conceptually through the full Husserlian concepts of "attention," "ostention," and "intuition"; finally, an E-operation transforms presence into adequacy, and satisfaction into apodicticity. These two last operators (not considering the metaphorical dimensions) constitute, for Gil, the core of Husserl's phenomenological analysis. They are rooted, however, in the efficacy of an X-operation hallucinating aesthesis from desire, which is beyond the reach of Husserl's phenomenological methods of description.
The object of evidence is something existent, and all existents are individual, says Gil in the final chapter of his Traité de l'évidence. Husserl's dictum in Etfahrung und Urtei/-"experience is the evidence of individual objects"-is, then, for Gil, a truth that points back to unsuspected depths of our psychic life. They explain, we could say at last, following Gil's analyses, why experience of a surrounding world of individual objects is, for us, something so interesting and so unavoidable.
João Paisana (1945 Paisana ( -2001 was a professor at the Faculty of Letters of University of Lisbon, Portugal. His main work Fenomenologia e Hermeneutice studies the difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies. He characterizes the first as reflexive and explicative, and the second as hermeneutical. According to Paisana, both authors would agree that only a meaning-structure could capture a being as such, disagreeing, however, about its nature. For Husserl, this structure has "Idem., p. 11. "Idem, p. 220. an apophantic character and is revealed through an analysis of the intentional content of the acts of consciousness, while, for Heidegger, this structure is revealed in an "encounter" which grounds the possibility of predication and the constitution of being as an object for a theoretical stance. The core of Paisana's argument is to claim that, not only do the modalities of this "encounter," established by Heidegger, arise from a development of the ais Struktur, as Husserl presented it in Logische Untersuchungen, but also that the hermeneutical reinterpretation of the ais Strulctur allows for the overcoming of some difficulties in the explicative phenomenology.
Trying to describe the intentional content of a lived experience in Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl draws a distinction between three senses in which such content can be understood: either as an intentional object, or as the act matter in opposition to its quality, or as an intentional essence. Within the first sense, however, Husserl still makes a further distinction: between the object as such and that same object according to how -ais was-it is intended. Husserl defends, therefore, that in any intentional act an object can only be intended insofar as it is determined in a certain way: for example, the Emperor of Germany as the Emperor of Germany and not, for instance, as the grandson of Queen Victoria. The intentions are not, however, strictly nominal. A full intentional act has a syntactic structure, conveying categorical elements that are not given in sensible intuition. Thus the well-known question of "categorical intuition": it seems that it pervades already the putative more simple and fundamental sphere of sensible intuition.
In his work, Paisana analyses Heidegger's position regarding the theory of categorical intuition, which the latter considered the Brennpunkt of Logische Untersuchungen. If, as Husserl proposes, the perceived is in fact an object, the objectuality of the object is not itself perceived in sensible intuition, but depends of a previous understanding of the sense of being. According to Heidegger, this paradox was not sufficiently taken into account by Husserl given that, when referring to the sensible object, Husserl never thinks of the thing perceived as such, but always of it already determined as an object. Being, for Husserl, is being an object, as Heidegger will say, and this purported evidence will allow Husserl to defend that between categorical and sensible intuition there is a relation of grounding whereupon the first is grounded upon the latter. Husserl could not, therefore, notice the limits of his explicative phenomenology, that is, the impossibility of accounting for the modalities of the pre-objective "encounter" with being as such. For Heidegger, for the intuition of a being to be possible, as well as predication, a previous understanding of the sense of being is already presupposed. Heideggerian phenomenology will thus adopt the figure of a hermeneutics of factic existence where the understanding of being originally takes place.
Paisana argues that Husserl, after the Logische Untersuchungen, and particularly after the Ideen, only intended to determine the possibilities of explicative phenomenology, grounding it on the fact that consciousness, through reflection, comes to an explicit experience of what it objectifies. It is the epochë, then, which will allow phenomenology the exclusive concentration on the transcendental field. In order for phenomenology to be able to present itself as a universal science and not as a particular science of the psychic realm, it would be necessary that it could present consciousness as an autonomous reality from which all other kinds of reality are constituted. However, the author interprets Husserl's position after the publication of the Ideen as consisting also in a partial self-criticism in relation to the positions defended in this work, in particular, regarding the manner in which the intentional analysis was conducted.
Husserl becomes aware that the world is more than a fluid and changing field of perceived things, but also implies a horizon which surrounds the perceived and refers to a bundle of possibilities of penetrating it. In other words, Husserl recognizes the need to abandon the primacy of intentional objectifying acts. They presuppose a more fundamental kind of "intentionality" or, to speak Heidegger's language, they are based in a previous encounter and in a previous comprehension of the sense of beingness.
Will this final turn of Husserl's thought allow for reconciliation between explicative phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology? That possibility will be denied by Paisana.
For Husserl, the pre-given world will not let itself be studied in the natural attitude of everyday life. The access to it requires the practice of an epoche, even if of a different kind than the one developed in Ideen. This new epochë-as an epochë of the objective sciences-is required by the new orientation of intentional analysis that does not start from the objectifying consciousness, as it happened in the work from 1913. As Paisana recognizes, remembering Husserl's own words in Krisis, it has its starting point in the universal constitutive life in which the world appears as continuously pre-given. But this is, nonetheless, a new orientation still within explicative phenomenology; it is not a severing from it and an approach to the theses of the hermeneutics of facticity. The point is that, as the author defends, now referring to Erfahrung und Urteil, this pre-given world, albeit it is ante-predicative, is not pre-objective, it is a world of individual objects perceptively constituted that passes continuously to the theoretical stance through the spontaneity of judgment. Even departing from intentionality as an objectifying act and reaching the pre-given world of the Lebenswelt, the question about the "objectuality of objects" (or about the sense of being in Heidegger's idiom) remains a silent and dark point in Husserl's explicative phenomenology. This is why, for Paisana, explicative phenomenology must be overturned by hermeneutic phenomenology. 
